The Right to Health in a multi-level perspective. by Giannotta, Marco
 
JDREAM. Journal of interDisciplinary REsearch Applied to Medicine  
JDREAM (2018), v. 2 i. 1, 93-97 
ISSN 2532-7518 
DOI 10.1285/i25327518v2i1p93 
                                                                                       http://siba-ese.unisalento.it, © 2018 Università del Salento 
 
93 




1 Department of History, Society and Human Studies, University of Salento, Italy 
 
 
A fundamental right of every human being is 
the right to health, which implies the right to 
life and as such, it is fundamental, unavailable, 
non-erodible and practically enforceable. The 
right to health is a universal principle that 
emerges in the Preamble of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization (WHO); it is 
universally recognized by the human person, 
and directly ascribable to the supreme value of 
life, which constitutes the capacity for imma-
nent action (Sgreccia, Spagnolo 1999). 
In accomplished democracies, the right to 
health has an absolute value. This absoluteness 
is due to the principle of being recognized by 
everybody as well as from the fact that it guar-
antees an erga omnes value, meaning that nobody 
can assume facts or behaviors that could harm 
such a right. 
For instance, article 32 of the Italian Constitu-
tion defines the Right to health as a fundamen-
tal1 and absolute right, protected by the Consti-
tution in a full and unconditional way with re-
spect to everyone, without distinction of race, 
religion, political belief, economic and social 
conditions, therefore a “precondition” for the 
exercise of all other rights (Luciani 2003). 
In accordance with the Italian Constitution, in 
fact, the need to protect physical health is em-
phasized as much as the psychical one. In par-
ticular, the Constitutional Court focuses on 
health care2, i. e. all the “positive interventions for the 
protection and promotion of human health”, which re-
quires not only care but also an affective and 
relational support. It is then clear that an ex-
                                                          
1 In article 32, the Constituent stated that «Republic protects 
health as a fundamental right of the individual and in the in-
terest of the community, and guarantees free treatment for 
the needy. No one can be obliged to take any particular med-
ical treatment except by legal provision. Under no circum-
stances can the law violate the limits imposed by respect for 
the human person». 
2 Constitutional Court, judgment of 30th September 1999, n. 
382, in Giurisprudenza Costiuzionale, 1999. 
haustive analysis of the dynamics and problems 
connected with the “right to health” issue can-
not be separated from the existing European 
legislation in this field, given the complemen-
tary role that this legislation has in the Member 
States’ legal systems (Cuocolo 2005). 
Since from the initial foundation of the Com-
munity, it is not possible to elicit a comprehen-
sive discipline of social rights. The failure to in-
clude a comprehensive set of social rights in the 
Community texts is due to the historical post-
war situation in Europe, characterized by the 
government control of monetary policy, which 
is crucial for the construction of the State sys-
tem. However, it is possible to find a track of 
social measures from the founding Treaties and, 
above all, relating to health care. In particular, 
article 100A of the treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community provided that the Commis-
sion should pursue a high level of public health 
protection when adopting measures aimed at 
reconciling Member States’ legislation. 
An important step forward was made in 1986, 
with the Single European Act, which combines 
the three Communities with the European po-
litical cooperation and extends the Communi-
ty’s competences concerning the subject under 
discussion (Cartabia, Weiler 2000). The Single 
Act adds a Title on economic and social cohe-
sion to the EC Treaty (article 130); it also high-
lights the importance of the European Com-
munity to pursuing social justice objectives in 
the Preamble, recalling the principles of the So-
cial Charter of the Council of Europe approved 
in 1961 (D’Intino et alii 2006, 7-9).  
However, these predictions cannot be translat-
ed into a catalogue of fundamental social rights. 
If, therefore, emphasis must be focused on 
launching the development of Community so-
cial policies, it is not possible to identify a real 
breakthrough in the Single European Act in 
terms of protecting the rights of individuals and 
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explicitly in health protection, which must be 
pursued in all Community development poli-
cies. 
In 1992, the Treaty on European Union (TEU) 
known as Maastricht Treaty amended the TEC 
by identifying the achievement of a high level 
of health protection as one of the Union’s main 
aims. Title X of the TEU is dedicated to ‘‘Public 
Health’’ and it is composed of a single article 
129; it underlines the need for Community in-
tervention to complement State action in order 
to achieve a high level of protection of human 
health (Pitino 2003, D’Intino et alii 2006 , 162). 
Finally, article 6 of the TEU, in line with the 
approach developed by the Court of Justice, af-
firms the Union’s obligation to respect funda-
mental rights guaranteed by the European 
Convention on Human Rights as they result 
from the traditions common to the Member 
States as general principles of Community law 
(Ferrari 2001, 4). 
However, this provision does not seem to be 
extendable to social rights: the reference made 
by article 6 in fact, it is apparently restricted to 
the fundamental rights of freedoms, which are 
effectively governed by the above-mentioned 
Convention. The rights set out in the European 
Social Charter and, therefore the right to health 
are thus excluded. 
In the framework set out in the Maastricht 
Treaty, it should be pointed out that the princi-
ple of harmonization of national policies has 
been tending to be replaced by the open meth-
od of coordination, which aims to share infor-
mation between Member States in order to 
identify best practice in individual areas, with-
out imposing minimum requirements for indi-
vidual states  
The real breakthrough in the protection of so-
cial rights came in 1997 with the Amsterdam 
Treaty, which entered into force on 1st May 
1999 (Zanetta 2003, 48). 
Article 3 (p) requires Community action to con-
tribute to the attainment of a high level of 
health protection. The most relevant aspect 
consists in the introduction of the article 152 
TEC, replacing the former Article 129 TEU, 
which enshrines the basic principles of Com-
munity action on the protection of human 
health. More exhaustively, article 152 (1) pro-
vides that a high level of health protection is to 
be ensured in the definition and implementa-
tion of all Community policies and activities. 
This Article provides that Community action is 
to be directed primarily towards the prevention 
of diseases by encouraging research to their 
causes and transmission, as well as health in-
formation and education. It is clear that the 
provision introduced by the Treaty of Amster-
dam differs from Article 129, which provided 
for a very marginal role for the Community in-
stitutions, merely as a subsidy for the action of 
the Member States. On the contrary, article 152 
places health protection as a general criterion to 
be followed in the implementation of all Com-
munity policies. The protection of health is 
therefore not a material matter, but a criterion, 
a Community principle in the light of which the 
action of the Community bodies can be read. It 
is of fundamental importance to clarify that in 
Community law, after Amsterdam, the protec-
tion of human health is almost an obligatory re-
sult, which cannot be sacrificed in balance with 
the other guiding principles of Community ac-
tion. 
Moreover, Article 152 (1) takes into considera-
tion not only the ‘‘healing’’ aspect of health 
protection, but also the preventive aspect; this 
is, in particular, a profile that considers the 
Community provisions more advanced than 
those of the national Constitutions, including 
the provision of Article 32 of the Italian Consti-
tution and that requires new standards of pro-
tection in member states, also with respect to 
prevention aspects. 
Article 152 (2) provides that ‘‘Community shall 
encourage cooperation between Member States 
in the areas covered by this article and, where 
necessary, support their action. The Member 
States in liaison with the Commission shall co-
ordinate among themselves their policies and 
programs in the areas referred to in paragraph 
1. The Commission, in strict contact with the 
Member States, may take any useful initiative to 
promote such coordination’’. The provision in-
corporates some of the principles contained in 
above-mentioned article 129, that reiterates the 
necessary harmonization of Member States’ 
policies. 
Article 152 (3), supplementing the principle of 
harmonization set out in the second subpara-
graph, provides that ‘‘The Community and its 
Member States foster the cooperation with 
third countries and the competent international 
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organizations in the field of public health’’. The 
achievement of the objectives set out in Article 
152 may require Community measures to com-
plement the actions of Member States, but it 
mainly involves encouraging cooperation be-
tween States, in accordance with the principle 
of subsidiarity. 
At institutional level, defined in Article 152, in-
centive actions shall be adopted by the Council 
acting in accordance with the co-decision pro-
cedure, while recommendations shall be adopt-
ed by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission. The Council, therefore, becomes 
one of the main players in achieving health pro-
tection standards. Nevertheless, the provisions 
contained in the fourth subparagraph are not 
exhaustive of Community action in the field of 
health, but are only part of Community compe-
tence; this is also confirmed in the open clause 
of point (c), which requires the Council to 
adopt any incentive measure, provided that it 
does not involve forced harmonization of na-
tional legislation (Pitino 2003, 306).  
One of the most important forecasts intro-
duced by the Amsterdam Treaty is that of Arti-
cle 152 (5), according to which: ‘‘Community 
action in the field of public health fully respects 
the responsibilities of the Member States for 
the organization and delivery of health services 
and medical care’’; direct Community interven-
tion in the provision of health services is there-
fore excluded. The fifth subparagraph, com-
bined with the impossibility for the Council to 
adopt harmonization measures, leads to the 
conclusion that there is still a lack of instru-
ments for regulating the public health service at 
Community level, the definition of which is left 
to the legislation of individual Member States, 
which often differ widely from one another 
(Cilione 2003, 75). 
It is not easy to balance the actual scope of the 
statements of principle contained in the original 
Community law: while the guarantee of high 
levels of health protection is a fundamental 
principle of all Community policies, on the oth-
er hand, the community lacks the means to reg-
ulate the forms of health protection in practice, 
that must be guaranteed to all European citi-
zens (Sciullo 2004). 
These considerations raise a few questions 
about the content of European citizenship, 
which does not seem to identify itself with a set 
of Community social rights yet. 
The final step on the road to European social 
rights before reaching the Constitutional Treaty 
is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union, which was adopted in Nice in 
December 2000. One of the characteristics of 
the Nice Charter is the particular system, which, 
although it acknowledges social rights, does not 
divide them according to traditional genera-
tions. 
In this regard, it should also be pointed out that 
the Nice Charter, although it has a high sym-
bolic value as a result of a solemn proclamation, 
has no binding force in terms of positive law. 
The principles of the Nice Charter are useful 
mainly as interpretative arguments and that has 
a particular significance in consideration of 
what it is expressed by the article 6 of the Maas-
tricht Treaty, which sets out a circular dynamic 
of fundamental rights (Azzena 2001, 135). 
However, it is not possible to compare the ex-
tent of a legally binding act with that of an in-
terpretative instrument, particularly in relation 
to social rights, which, although largely gov-
erned by the Charter, are not covered by the ar-
ticle 6 TCE. 
The Charter’s Preamble strengthens the weight 
of fundamental rights in the Community system 
as they derive from constitutional traditions and 
international obligations common to the Mem-
ber States, the TEU, the Community Treaties, 
the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
and the Social Charters adopted by the Com-
munity as well as the Council of Europe. In ad-
dition, the rights recognized by the jurispru-
dence of the European Court of Justice and the 
European Court of Human Rights are reaf-
firmed. The provisions concerning the right to 
health protection are the first three articles in-
cluded in Chapter I, ‘‘Dignity’’.  
In particular, Article 1 recognizes human digni-
ty as inviolable, prescribing the necessary re-
spect and protection; Article 2 guarantees the 
right to life for every individual; Article 3, final-
ly, affirms the right to physical integrity, dictat-
ing specific prescriptions for medical activities. 
These provisions are undoubtedly important 
and clearly demonstrate the protection afforded 
by Community law to aspects of the negative 
right to health, i. e. the right not to receive 
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harm to one’s own health. As far as the positive 
aspects of health protection are concerned, the 
analysis must focus on Article 35 dedicated to 
the’’ Protection of health’’ in Chapter IV dedi-
cated to’’ Solidarity’’. 
Article 35 provides that’’ Everyone has the right 
of access to health prevention and medical 
treatment under the conditions laid down by 
national laws and practices. A high level of hu-
man health protection shall be ensured in the 
definition and implementation of all Union pol-
icies and activities”. While the second period of 
the provision reproduces Article 152 of the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, the first period introduc-
es even more explicitly the right to preventive 
and rehabilitative treatment to protect individu-
al health. 
Despite the limited legal scope of the Nice 
Charter, it is essential to note the definitive sep-
aration between the concept of the protection 
of human health and the pursuit of other 
Community objectives and the qualification of 
the right to health protection as a right of the 
individual. On the other hand, the wording 
used in the Nice Charter does not serve as a ba-
sis for Community competence in regulating 
the public health service; The Charter states 
that the right to prevention and treatment is 
guaranteed within the limits of national laws 
and practices. 
In a certain sense, this provision is the result of 
an obligatory line of action since, from the Pre-
amble onwards, it is detected the scope of the 
rights set out above all in Article 51, which 
states that the Charter’’ does not introduce new 
powers or tasks for the Community and the 
Union, nor does it modify the powers and tasks 
defined in the Treaties’’. 
It is crucial at this point to reflect on the effec-
tive protection of the law at Community level. 
In this sense, first of all, a negative limit can be 
identified, which consists in the choice to refer 
to the laws of the member states the organiza-
tion and the concrete regulation of the public 
health service; a consideration resulting from 
the application of the principle of vertical sub-
sidiarity that requires to allocate functions to 
the level of government as close as possible to 
the citizens (Arena 2006; Albanese, Marzuoli 
2003; Moscarini 2003; D’Intino 2006). 
This choice is due, on the one hand, to the dif-
ferent traditions of social rights in the various 
European experiences, and, on the other hand, 
to the numerous and fragmented forms of 
regulation which are based on different models 
and which provide for different forms of divi-
sion of competences between the state and de-
centralized levels of government (Cuocolo 
2005). 
It can be said, therefore, that the competences 
of the health service are still destined to be 
placed at state or sub-state level for a long time, 
as it is indirectly confirmed in the Green Paper on 
services of general interest (COM-2003-270), which 
attracts only those public services of economic 
importance to the Community competition 
rules. However, this does not detract from the 
fact that the Community institutions can also 
play a leading role in terms of health protection. 
In order to understand the extent to which this 
is happening, it is necessary to wonder what in-
struments and techniques for regulating the 
right to health are permitted by the Treaty that 
establishes a Constitution for Europe, approved 
by the Intergovernmental Conference on 18 
June 2004 in Brussels and signed on 29 Octo-
ber 2004 in Rome (Letta 2006, 14-15). The 
Constitutional Treaty in Part II includes the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and, in particu-
lar, in article II-35 it takes over article 35 of the 
Charter, which deals with the protection of 
human health. 
On the other hand, article 152 TEC, introduced 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam, is reproduced in 
article III-179 within Section I’’ Public Health’’ 
where Chapter V is dedicated to ‘‘Sectors in 
which the Union may decide to demonstrate 
coordination, integration and support action’’. 
In the adopted perspective, it is relevant the 
wording of the seventh paragraph correspond-
ing to article 152 (5) TEC. In fact, it is well af-
firmed the competence of each member state to 
define public health policies and the organiza-
tion and delivery of the public health service; it 
specifies that ‘‘the responsibilities of member 
states include the management of health ser-
vices and medical care as well as the allocation 
of resources destined to them’’. 
It is evident that Community action in the 
healthcare sector would never lead to the crea-
tion of a European health system. It can be as-
sumed that human health is not a competence 
of the Union, but only a criterion to be fol-
lowed in regulating subjects. In support of this 
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argument, it could be emphasized that the Nice 
Charter did not recognize a subjective right to 
health protection. If this were the case, health 
protection would be a sort of’’ filter’’ through 
which to read every Community act, but not a 
competence of the Union that would legitimize 
the development of autonomous policies.  
On the contrary, it can be assumed that health 
protection, even with all the limitations high-
lighted, is a proper subject that should belong 
to the shared competence of the Union (Pitino 
2003). 
This reconstruction is confirmed by article I-13 
of the Constitutional Treaty that identifies the 
areas of shared competence of the Union in 
point (b) of the second paragraph; it makes ex-
press reference to social policy, as regards the 
aspects defined in Part III. Where this is true, 
the guarantee of a high level of human health 
protection can also be the subject of specific 
policies and, in this context, the provision of 
specific’’ essential Community levels’’ of health 
care could even be envisaged. 
Community protection could thus absorb the 
constitutional principles of the state and, as far 
as Italian law is concerned, the essential levels 
of benefits relating to civil and social rights that 
must be guaranteed throughout Italy. The sce-
nario is certainly stimulating and it is not ex-
cluded that it may have significant develop-
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